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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-3058 
____________ 
 
ANIBAL ROLANDO ARROBO, 
        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
          Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A075-449-130) 
Immigration Judge: Mirlande Tadal 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 25, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 27, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Anibal Arrobo (“Arrobo”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ decision denying his motion for reconsideration.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will deny the petition for review. 
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 Arrobo, a native and citizen of Ecuador, is removable under Immigration & 
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien 
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.  On January 7, 2009, the 
Immigration Judge granted his application for voluntary departure, and gave him until 
March 9, 2009 to depart; alternatively, the IJ ordered his removal to Ecuador. 
 On January 24, 2009, Arrobo married a United States citizen, Sofia Fajardo, and 
she later filed a Form I-130 visa petition on his behalf.  On or about February 23, 2009, 
Arrobo filed a timely motion to reopen removal proceedings in Immigration Court, 8 
C.F.R. 1003.23(b), in order to pursue adjustment of status based on this marriage.  He 
requested that the period of voluntary departure be stayed, and he attached to his motion 
an application for adjustment of status, Fajardo’s recently filed immediate relative 
petition, and other documents supporting the validity of the marriage.  In an affidavit in 
support, Arrobo indicated his intention to apply for adjustment of status under INA § 
245(i), and he stated that he was the beneficiary of an immediate relative petition filed by 
his former United States citizen spouse Helen Resto (Arrobo) prior to the sunset of INA § 
245(i).  The Department of Homeland Security opposed the motion. 
 On March 13, 2009, the Immigration Judge denied the motion to reopen.  The IJ 
reasoned, in pertinent part, that Arrobo had not shown that he was eligible to adjust his 
status under INA § 245(i) because he had not shown that he was not the beneficiary of a 
“grandfathered” visa petition; that is, he was not the beneficiary of a labor certification or 
visa petition filed on or before April 30, 2001.  Arrobo appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, contending, among other things, that he is the beneficiary of a 
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grandfathered application for adjustment of status, that the record “contains, or should 
contain” a copy of a petition filed by his former wife, Helen Resto (Arrobo), A.R. 36, and 
he attached, for the first time, a visa petition bearing the signature “Helen Resto,” 
purportedly made on January 24, 1997, A.R. 41. 
 On December 9, 2010, the Board dismissed the appeal, concluding that the motion 
to reopen was properly denied because Arrobo failed to establish prima facie eligibility 
for adjustment of status, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3).  Specifically, the Board concluded 
that Arrobo failed to meet his burden of proof to show that he was the beneficiary of a 
visa petition filed before April 30, 2001, as required by INA § 245(i)(1)(B)(i).  The Board 
noted that Arrobo had submitted on appeal a Form I-130 visa petition, purportedly signed 
by his former spouse in 1997, but the Board declined to treat the new evidence as a basis 
for a remand because there was no indication whatever that the petition was properly 
filed, or approvable when filed, 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(a)(1)(i)(A) (“Grandfathered alien 
means an alien who is the beneficiary  . . . of [a] petition . . . which was properly filed 
with the Attorney General on or before April 30, 2001, and which was approvable when 
filed.”).  Last, the Board held that the IJ did not err under Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 
(2008), in declining to stay the period of voluntary departure. 
 On January 10, 2011, Arrobo filed a short motion for reconsideration of the 
Board’s decision, claiming again that he is the beneficiary of a grandfathered application 
for adjustment of status and is thus eligible to adjust his status, and that he had a visa 
petition pending that was approvable.  He also contested the Board’s reference in its 
December 9, 2010 decision to facts concerning an earlier date of entry into the United 
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States in 1994, and an earlier grant of voluntary departure in 2000, that were not a part of 
the record.1
 Arrobo has timely petitioned for review of the Board’s July 1, 2011 decision only.  
He argues in his brief that the agency erred in concluding that he did not establish prima 
facie eligibility for adjustment of status, erred in disregarding the visa petition executed 
by his former spouse, and erred in denying him voluntary departure.
 
 On July 1, 2011, the Board found no material errors in its previous decision, but 
nonetheless chose to reconsider the decision sua sponte and deny relief.  The Board 
decided that its statements regarding Arrobo’s arrival and a previous of grant of voluntary 
departure should be deleted from the prior decision; the statements were dicta in that they 
did not concern Arrobo’s failure to show prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status 
under INA § 245(i).  In all other respects, the Board concluded that there were no errors 
in its prior decision that Arrobo did not establish that a visa petition was filed on his 
behalf on or before April 30, 2001, and that any such petition was approvable when filed. 
2
 We will deny the petition for review.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1) and (b)(1) over the Board’s decision denying Arrobo’s motion for 
reconsideration.   Arrobo did not file a timely petition for review of the Board’s decision 
of December 9, 2010.  See Stone v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 514 U.S. 386, 
405 (1995). 
 
                                              
1 The Notice to Appear charged that Arrobo arrived in the United States in July, 2001. 
2 Although Arrobo cites Matter of Velarde, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253 (BIA 2002), in his brief, 
the issue before the agency, and here, concerns Arrobo’s eligibility for adjustment of 
status under INA § 245(i), and not whether his post-order of removal marriage to Fajardo 
is bona fide. 
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We review the Board’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of 
discretion. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992). 
Under this deferential standard of review, we will not disturb the Board’s decision unless 
it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to the law.  See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F. 3d 556, 562 
(3d Cir. 2004).  Motions to reconsider must demonstrate that the earlier Board decision 
suffered from a material error of fact or law.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(6)(C).  The Board does not abuse its discretion when it denies a motion for 
reconsideration on the ground that its original decision denying a motion to reopen was 
correct in all material respects.  See id. 
As the Board noted, the agency may deny a motion to reopen where a prima facie 
case for the relief sought has not been established.  See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 
166, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2002); Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464 (BIA 1992).  Arrobo 
sought to reopen proceedings so that he could apply for adjustment of status under INA § 
245(i).  To be eligible for this form of relief, the applicant, who has entered the United 
States without being admitted or paroled, must demonstrate, among other things, that he 
is the recipient of relative or labor petition filed on or before April 30, 2001, and that the 
petition was approvable when filed.  8 U.S.C. § 1255(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10.  Arrobo did 
not make this showing.  The Form I-130 signed by his former wife, Helen, which was 
dated January 24, 1997, AR 41-42, and which was submitted for the first time on appeal 
to the Board, was Arrobo’s attempt to comply with this requirement of INA § 245(i), but, 
as the Board noted, this petition is not a part of the administrative record, and there is 
nothing in the administrative record to establish when, or if, this petition was ever filed.  
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The item submitted by Arrobo bears no evidence, like a date stamp, of filing in 1997 or at 
any other time.   
It is insufficient for Arrobo to assert, without more, that the record “should” have 
contained this petition when he has provided insufficient detail concerning the alleged 
filing of this petition by his former spouse.  We note that he had ample opportunity to do 
so.  Contrary to Arrobo’s assertion, see Petitioner’s Brief, at 13, under the circumstances 
presented here, where removal proceedings were not initiated until July, 2001, it is his 
burden, and not the government’s, to provide documentary evidence to establish 
compliance with the requirements of INA § 245(i).  See Luevano v. Holder, 660 F.3d 
1207, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011) (alien has burden to establish his adjustment eligibility).  
Moreover, the government plainly opposed both his motion to reopen and his motion for 
reconsideration. 
 Accordingly, as the Board concluded, Arrobo did not supply persuasive evidence 
that he is the beneficiary of a family-based petition that was filed before the sunset of 
INA § 245(i).  Insofar as there were no material errors in the Board’s original decision 
dismissing Arrobo’s appeal from the IJ’s denial of his motion to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(b)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C), its decision with respect to Arrobo’s motion for 
reconsideration was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. 
Last, pursuant to a regulation which went into effect on January 20, 2009 and thus 
before Arrobo filed his motion to reopen, his grant of voluntary departure automatically 
terminated when he filed the motion.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(e)(1) (“The filing of a motion 
to reopen or reconsider prior to the expiration of the period allowed for voluntary 
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departure has the effect of automatically terminating the grant of voluntary departure, and 
accordingly does not toll, stay, or extend the period allowed for voluntary departure.”)  
We note that Arrobo has not challenged the validity of this regulation.  Moreover, as 
Arrobo himself notes, see Petitioner’s Brief, at 14, Dada, 554 U.S. 1, holds only that an 
alien may withdraw a voluntary departure request as long as the request is made within 
the voluntary departure period. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
